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1 Introduction
A hedonic coalition formation game describes a situation in which every
player￿ s payo⁄ depends only on the members of her coalition ([5]). De-
spite the simplicity of the model, it turned out that the question of the
existence of a core partition, that is, a partition of the set of all players
for which there is no group of individuals who can all be better o⁄ by
forming a new deviating coalition, does not have an easy answer. A
weak top coalition property introduced in [1] turned out to be a suf-
￿cient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a hedonic game.
This property was shown in [3] to be independent of the ordinal version
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1of the well known Scarf-balancedness condition ([9]) guaranteeing the
existence of a core partition as well.
Clearly, the set of all core partitions of a hedonic game is internally
stable, i.e., any partition that is in the core cannot be dominated (in
a sense to be de￿ned) by another core partition. However, as we show
in Section 3, neither the weak top coalition property nor the ordinal
balancedness condition assure that the core enjoys external stability,
i.e., it may happen that a non-member of the core is not dominated by
any core partition. Moreover, there is no superset of the core of the
games considered, which is both internally and externally stable; i.e.,
there is even no stable set ([13]) in these games. A stronger version of
the weak top coalition property (the top coalition property) does not
guarantee the external stability of the core, either.
In this paper we show that imposing size monotonicity on players￿
preferences over individually rational coalitions in hedonic games has
two implications: (1) it guarantees the existence of a core partition, and
(2) strengthening this condition to strong size monotonicity allows for a
full characterization of the set of core partitions which turns out to be
also externally stable and thus, the unique stable set (cf. Section 4). The
domain of (strongly) size monotonic hedonic games includes the aversion
to enemies type of preferences studied in [4], and it covers for instance
situations in which a person joins a group as to increase her local status
(cf. [14]).
Our work is also related to the study of core stability in two-sided
matching problems and in non-transferable utility (NTU) games. Sta-
ble sets in one-to-one matching problems were studied in [6] and it was
in particular shown that the (non-empty) core in such problems is the
unique stable set if and only if it is a maximal set which is a lattice with
the unmatched agents being identical for all matchings in the set. How-
ever, as shown in [6], this result do not extend to many-to-one matching
2problems. Hence, as many-to-one matching problems are special hedonic
games, it is not surprising that we need a rather strong condition as to
assure the external stability of the core. On the other hand, a hedonic
game can be seen as an NTU game, where for each coalition the set of
feasible payo⁄ vectors is a cube (cf. [3], p. 209). Most of the literature
on stable sets in NTU games is devoted to the study of the relationships
between largeness (cf. [10]) and external stability of the core for the case
of convex games (cf. [7, 11, 8]). For general NTU games it was shown in
[2] that if the core is large, then it is a stable set. In order to establish
this result, one needs however a no-level-segment condition imposed on
the sets of feasible payo⁄ vectors; this condition is clearly not satis￿ed
when looking at a hedonic game as an NTU game.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a ￿nite set of players N = f1;:::;ng. A coalition is a non-
empty subset of N. For each player i 2 N, by Ni = fX ￿ N j i 2 Xg
we denote the collection of all coalitions containing i. A collection C of
coalitions is called a coalition structure if C is a partition of N, i.e., the
coalitions in C are pairwise disjoint and [C2CC = N. By CN we denote
the set of all coalition structures of N. For each coalition structure
C 2 CN and each player i 2 N, by C(i) we denote the coalition in C
which contains i, i.e., fC(i)g = C \ Ni.
We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference ￿i
over Ni, i.e., a binary relation over Ni which is complete and transitive.
We denote by ￿= (￿1;:::;￿n) a pro￿le of preferences. Moreover, we
assume that the preference of each player i 2 N over coalition structures
is purely hedonic, i.e., it is completely characterized by ￿i in such a way
that, for each C;C0 2 CN, player i weakly prefers C to C0 if and only
if C(i) ￿i C0(i). A hedonic game on a ￿nite set N of players with a
preference pro￿le ￿ is denoted by the pair (N;￿).
3De￿nition 1 Let (N;￿) be a hedonic game and C 2 CN. Then C is a
core partition for (N;￿) if there does not exist a coalition S such that
S ￿i C(i) for all i 2 S.
Let (N;￿) be a hedonic game. Given two coalition structures C and
C0, and a coalition S 2 C, we say that C dominates C0 via S, denoted by
C BS C0, if S = C(i) ￿i C0(i) for all i 2 S. Moreover, we simply say that
C dominates C0, denoted by C B C0, if C BS C0 for some S 2 C.
De￿nition 2 Let (N;￿) be a hedonic game and V ￿ CN. Then V is
called a stable set of (N;￿) if the following two conditions hold:
(1) (Internal stability) For all C;C0 2 V, we have C 7 C0;
(2) (External stability) For all C0 2 CN n V, there is C 2 V such that
C B C0.
A stable set of a hedonic game does not allow for inner contradic-
tions, i.e., any partition that is stable can not be dominated by another
partition that is also in the stable set. Moreover, every coalition struc-
ture excluded from the stable set is dominated by some partition in the
stable set. Observe that the set of all core partitions is internally stable,
and hence, it is a subset of each stable set, and if it is also externally
stable, then it is the unique stable set of the corresponding game.
3 Top coalitions, ordinal balancedness, and stable
sets
As a starting point, let us consider two well known su¢ cient conditions
for non-emptiness of the core in hedonic games - the weak top coali-
tion property and the ordinal balancedness condition introduced in [1]
and [3], respectively. The ￿rst condition imposes a certain degree of
commonality in players￿preferences and it is mainly motivated by the
multiplicity of economic applications as illustrated in [1]. The second
condition is in fact an ordinal version of the Scarf-balancedness condi-
4tion ([9]) which is often used to prove the non-emptiness of the core in
NTU games.
De￿nition 3 Given a hedonic game (N;￿) and a non-empty player set
X ￿ N, a coalition S ￿ X is
(1) a top coalition of X if for any i 2 S and any T ￿ X with i 2 T
we have S ￿i T, and
(2) a weak top coalition of X if it has an ordered partition fS1;:::;S‘g
such that (i) for any i 2 S1 and any T ￿ X with i 2 T we have S ￿i T,
and (ii) for any k > 1, any i 2 Sk and any T ￿ X with i 2 T we have
that T ￿i S implies T \ ([m<kSm) 6= ;.
A hedonic game satis￿es the (weak) top coalition property if for each
non-empty player set X ￿ N, there exists a (weak) top coalition of X.
As it turns out, the top coalition property does not guarantee the
external stability of the core (Game 1), while its weaker version is not
su¢ cient for the existence of stable sets in hedonic games (Game 2).
Game 1 Let N = f1;2;3g and players￿preferences be as follows:
12 ￿1 123 ￿1 13 ￿1 1;
123 ￿2 23 ￿2 12 ￿2 2;
13 ￿3 23 ￿3 123 ￿3 3:
Claim Game 1 satis￿es the top coalition property and its core is not
externally stable.
Proof. It is easy to check that each singleton and each doubleton is a
top coalition of itself, and that 23 is the unique top coalition of 123, i.e.,
the game satis￿es the top coalition property. The core partitions are
f1;23g and f123g. Notice however that the partition f13;2g is blocked
only by 12, and 12 does not belong to any core element, i.e., the core
of the game is not externally stable. It is worth mentioning that the
coalition 123 (which is the unique member of a core partition) is not a
5top coalition of itself.
Game 2 Let N = f1;2;3g and players￿preferences be as follows:
123 ￿1 12 ￿1 13 ￿1 1;
23 ￿2 12 ￿2 123 ￿2 2;
13 ￿3 123 ￿3 23 ￿3 3:
Claim Game 2 satis￿es the weak top coalition property and it has no
stable set.
Proof. The fact that the above game satis￿es the weak top coalition
property was shown in ([3], p. 212), i.e., we have only to show that it
has no stable set.
Let C1 = f1;2;3g, C2 = f12;3g, C3 = f13;2g, C4 = f1;23g, and
C5 = f123g. The core of this game consists only of C5, and C5 can not
dominate C2, i.e., fC5g is not a stable set.
Suppose now that there is a stable set V for this game with C5 2
V 6= fC5g. Notice that C5 B123 C1, i.e., C1 = 2 V. Moreover, by internal
stability, the stable set V cannot contain the following pairs of coalition
structures: C2 and C3 (because C2 B12 C3), C2 and C4 (because C4 B23
C2), and C3 and C4 (because C3 B13 C4). Notice that if V = fC3;C5g,
then C2 can not be dominated; if V = fC4;C5g, then C3 can not be
dominated, and if V = fC2;C5g, then C4 can not be dominated. Thus,
we conclude that there is no stable set in this game.
As we shall see next, the ordinal balancedness condition does not
guarantee the existence of stable sets in hedonic games either.
De￿nition 4 A family B of coalitions is called balanced if there exists
a vector of positive weights dX (with X 2 B) such that, for each player
i 2 N,
P
X2B\Ni dX = 1. A hedonic game (N;￿) is ordinally balanced
if, for each balanced family B of coalitions, there exists a partition C of N
such that for each i 2 N there exists a coalition X 2 B \ Ni satisfying
C(i) ￿i X.
6In other words, if we would like to check whether a game is ordinally
balanced we have to ￿nd for each balanced family of coalitions a partition
of N, in which every player is weakly better o⁄ in comparison to her
worst situation in the corresponding balanced family.
Game 3 Let N = f1;2;3g and players￿preferences be as follows:
12 ￿1 123 ￿1 13 ￿1 1;
23 ￿2 123 ￿2 12 ￿2 2;
13 ￿3 123 ￿3 23 ￿3 3:
Claim Game 3 is ordinally balanced and it has no stable set.
Proof. The ordinal balancedness of the game was shown in ([3], p. 213),
while the check that there are no stable sets follows exactly the proof of
the corresponding claim for Game 2.
4 Size monotonicity and stability of the core
Let (N;￿) be a hedonic game and R(N;￿) be the collection of all indi-
vidually rational coalitions in (N;￿). That is,
R(N;￿) = fX 2 2
N n f;g j 8i 2 X;X ￿i figg:
De￿nition 5 A hedonic game (N;￿) is
(i) size monotonic, if for each i 2 N and X;Y 2 R(N;￿) \ Ni,
jXj ￿ jY j implies X ￿i Y ;
(ii) strongly size monotonic, if it is size monotonic and for each
i 2 N and X;Y 2 R(N;￿) \ Ni, jXj > jY j implies X ￿i Y .
As we ￿rst show, there are strongly size monotonic games which sat-
isfy neither the weak top coalition property nor the ordinal balancedness
condition.
7Game 4 Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g and players￿preferences be as follows:
1235 ￿1 123 ￿1 125 ￿1 135 ￿1 12 ￿1 13 ￿1 15 ￿1 1 ￿1 :::;
123 ￿2 12 ￿2 23 ￿2 2 ￿2 :::;
234 ￿3 23 ￿3 34 ￿3 3 ￿3 :::;
345 ￿4 34 ￿4 45 ￿4 4 ￿4 :::;
1345 ￿5 135 ￿5 145 ￿5 345 ￿5 15 ￿5 35 ￿5 45 ￿5 5 ￿5 ::::
Claim Game 4 is strongly size monotonic and satis￿es neither the weak
top coalition property nor the ordinal balancedness condition.
Proof. Consider ￿rst the weak top coalition property and take the set
X = f1;2;3g. We show that there is no weak top coalition for X. Notice
that no one of the singletons can be a weak top coalition for X because of
12 ￿1 1, 12 ￿2 2, and 23 ￿3 3. The same reason rules out all partitions
of candidates for a weak top coalition that have a singleton at the ￿rst
place. Because two of the players in X (1 and 2) prefer 123 to every
doubleton consisting of players in X, all partitions of candidates for a
weak top coalition that have a doubleton at the ￿rst place are ruled out
as well. The entire set X cannot be a weak top coalition of itself because,
let￿ s say, 3 ￿3 123. Hence, X has no weak top coalition, i.e., the game
does not satisfy the weak top coalition property.
As for the ordinal balancedness condition, let us take the follow-
ing balanced family with balanced weight 1=2 for each coalition: B =
f12;23;34;45;15g. Notice that, given B, all players do not like to re-
main single in a partition. Observe further that player 2 can be better
o⁄ in a partition (in comparison to her worst situation in B) if and only
if that partition contains one of the coalitions 12, 23, 123. Hence, the
possible candidates for such a partition are: f12;345g, which is not liked
by player 3; or f23;145g, which is not liked by player 1; or f123;45g,
which is not liked again by player 3. Hence, for the balanced family
of coalitions B there is no suitable partition of N, i.e., the game is not
ordinally balanced.
8For any hedonic game (N;￿), any P ￿ N and i 2 P, let ￿ijP stand
for the restriction of ￿i over 2P \ Ni, and the corresponding restricted
preference pro￿le be denoted by ￿jP.
Theorem 1 If (N;￿) is size monotonic, then it has a core partition.
Proof. Let (N;￿) be size monotonic and consider the following proce-
dure.
￿ Set P := N and C := ;.
￿ Repeat the following steps until P becomes empty.
￿Select one of the largest members of R(P;￿jP), say X;
￿Set P := P n X and C := C [ fXg.
￿ Return C.
Obviously, the outcome C of this procedure is a coalition structure.
We show that C is a core partition.
Let K = jCj and X1;:::;XK be coalitions such that C = fX1;:::;XKg
with Xk (1 ￿ k ￿ K) being the k-th coalition put into C by the above
procedure. In addition, let P1 = N and Pk = Pk￿1 n Xk￿1 for each
2 ￿ k ￿ K. We have then jX1j ￿ ::: ￿ jXKj and XK = PK.
Note ￿rst that Xk ￿i fig ￿i Y holds for each i 2 Xk and each Y 2
NinR(Pk;￿jPk). Moreover, we have from the procedure that jXkj ￿ jY j
for each Y 2 R(Pk;￿jPk), and by size monotonicity, Xk ￿i Y holds for
each i 2 Xk and each Y 2 Ni\R(Pk;￿jPk). Hence, for each 1 ￿ k ￿ K,
there are no deviations from C which belong to fY 2 2Pk j Xk \Y 6= ;g.
Note additionally that
fY 2 2





Finally, from XK = PK, we have fY 2 2PK j XK \ Y 6= ;g = 2PK n f;g.
Therefore, from [K
k=1fY 2 2Pk j Xk \ Y 6= ;g = 2N n f;g, there are no
deviations from C at all.
9Let (N;￿) be a hedonic game and ￿(N;￿) be the collection of all
coalition structures produced by the procedure in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 If (N;￿) is strongly size monotonic, then ￿(N;￿) is ex-
actly the set of core partitions in (N;￿). Moreover, ￿(N;￿) is exter-
nally stable.
Proof. Let (N;￿) be strongly size monotonic and consider the following
procedure with a coalition structure C as its input.
￿ Set P := N.
￿ Repeat the following steps.
￿Find the collection ￿P of all largest members of R(P;￿jP).
￿Test whether C \ ￿P = ;. If so, return P and halt; otherwise
set P := P n X, where X 2 C \ ￿P.
Observe that this procedure always halts for any given coalition struc-
ture, and the set P ￿ N obtained by applying it to a coalition structure
C is empty if and only if C 2 ￿(N;￿).
Suppose C = 2 ￿(N;￿) and let P ￿ N be obtained by the procedure





. Notice then that each coalition in C \ 2P is




or is of size strictly smaller than that of X. For
each i 2 X, C(i) = 2 R(P;￿jP) implies X ￿i fig ￿i C(i), while by strong
size monotonicity, jC(i)j < jXj implies X ￿i C(i). Therefore, X is a
deviation from C, and thus, C is not in the core of the game.
Finally, observe that there exists at least one member of ￿(N;￿)
including X, and therefore for every C = 2 ￿(N;￿), there exists at least
one C0 2 ￿(N;￿) including a coalition X satisfying X ￿i C(i) for each
i 2 X, i.e., ￿(N;￿) is externally stable.
As our last example shows, strong size monotonicity is crucial for the
external stability of the core.
10Game 5 Let N = f1;2;3g and players￿preferences be as follows:
123 ￿1 13 ￿1 1 ￿1 12;
123 ￿2 23 ￿2 2 ￿2 12;
13 ￿3 23 ￿3 3 ￿3 123:
Claim Game 5 is size monotonic but not strongly size monotonic and
its core is not externally stable.
Proof. The game is not strongly size monotonic as 13 ￿1 1. The
core partitions are f1;23g and f13;2g (and both of them can be found
by applying the procedure in Theorem 1). Notice however that the
partition f123g is blocked only by player 3, and the singleton containing
that player does not belong to any core element, i.e., the core of the
game is not externally stable.
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